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Prospect Theory in a Dynamic Game:  
Theory and Evidence from Online Pay-Per-Bid Auctions 
 
 
 
Abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision 
making under risk. Although prospect theory is a popular alternative, it is rarely applied in 
strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions. This study fills this 
research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic 
model. Using a large field data set from multiple online pay-per-bid auction sites, the authors 
empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferences makes a better 
out-of-sample prediction than a corresponding expected utility model. Prospect theory also 
provides a unified explanation for two behavioral anomalies: average auctioneer revenues 
above current retail prices and the sunk cost fallacy. The empirical results indicate that 
bidders are loss averse and overweight small probabilities, such that the expected revenue of 
the auction exceeds the current retail price by 25.46%. The authors illustrate and empirically 
confirm a managerial implication for how an auctioneer can increase revenue by changing the 
details of the auction design. 
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1. Introduction 
As early as Allais (1953), scholars have noted that expected utility theory (EUT) does not 
adequately describe decision making under risk. The leading alternative to EUT, (cumulative) 
prospect theory (PT; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), assumes 
that people evaluate gains differently from losses: a loss hurts a person more than a gain of the 
same size benefits him or her. Furthermore, the weights that a person attributes to outcomes of 
risky decisions do not coincide with the probabilities of the respective outcomes. This 
probability weighting typically leads to overweighting of small probabilities and 
underweighting of large probabilities. 
Extant research contains many successful applications of PT, especially in finance, 
insurance, and betting markets (for overviews of this literature, see Barberis 2013; Camerer 
2000). With the exception of Goeree et al. (2003), however, PT studies are similar in that the 
risk that people face is exogenous. In many real-world situations, in contrast, risk does not 
come from an exogenously given random device but rather is a result of the interaction of one 
person with others. 
A typical example is a meeting dedicated to find a volunteer for a public service, say, 
chairing a department. The meeting continues until (at least) one participant of the meeting 
volunteers. Each participant prefers to free ride over volunteering but dislikes the additional 
time that must be spent in the meeting to find a department chair. Thus, the decision of each 
participant to volunteer at a given point in time depends on the probability that one of the 
other participants will volunteer. This probability is not exogenous; it is determined by the 
strategies of the other participants in the meeting. This example is known as the dynamic 
volunteer’s dilemma (Bliss and Nalebuff 1984; Otsubo and Rapoport 2008). It is a typical 
case of a (general) war of attrition (Bulow and Klemperer 1999). Other applications of the 
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war of attrition include firms that compete to serve a natural monopoly market (Tirole 1988, 
p. 311f), bargaining (Abreu and Gul 2000), and election campaigns. However, despite the 
common view that PT is better than EUT at describing decision making under risk and the 
prevalence of situations in which risk arises through people’s interactions, only a few studies 
apply PT to these situations. 
The aim of this study is to propose and empirically apply a dynamic game theoretic model 
that accounts for endogenous risk that arises from the interaction between people and to use 
PT preferences for describing their behavior (hereinafter referred to as the “PT model”) to 
adequately capture their decision making under risk. In developing the PT model, we show 
(1) a solution strategy for incorporating PT into a dynamic game theoretic model and its 
empirical applicability to field data, (2) the usefulness of PT in describing people’s behavior, 
and (3) managerial implications that result from using PT over the more commonly used 
EUT. 
Several factors explain why it is unclear whether PT as a descriptive theory of decision 
making under risk extends to situations in which risk arises through individual interaction, as 
in the preceding dynamic volunteer’s dilemma example. First, in a strategic interaction, it is 
not sufficient that people themselves act according to PT; to form correct beliefs about other 
people’s actions, they must recognize that other people’s behavior is also best described by 
PT. Second, we cannot rely on the solution concepts commonly used to analyze strategic 
situations theoretically, because when departing from EUT, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist 
(Dekel et al. 1991). Moreover, behavior of people with PT preferences is not necessarily 
dynamically consistent (Dekel et al. 1991; Machina 1989). Consequently, a subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) does typically not exist.  
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For the empirical application, we use pay-per-bid auctions—another variant of the war of 
attrition. These auctions provide an effective testing ground for PT for several reasons. First, 
under EUT, pay-per-bid auctions have a SPNE in behavioral strategies; thus, the entire risk 
that a bidder faces is due to the strategies adopted by other bidders.1 Second, online pay-per-
bid auctions show two bidding behavior anomalies that challenge the application of EUT: (1) 
average auctioneer revenues well above the current retail price (CRP) and (2) the sunk cost 
fallacy.2 Third, online pay-per-bid auction websites generate large amounts of data, which 
allow us to estimate the model using an extensive field data set. 
Our results show that PT describes behavior in pay-per-bid auctions well. Although our PT 
parameter estimates only capture one person’s belief about another person’s PT preferences, 
the estimates are comparable to those found in controlled laboratory experiments in the 
context of individual decision making under risk. Thus, our results show that PT is an 
effective descriptive theory for people’s behavior and—a unique contribution of our study—
that it also adequately describes people’s beliefs about other people’s behavior. Because a 
SPNE does not exist, we use backward induction as our solution concept. We explicitly 
address dynamic inconsistency by considering various ways bidders address this 
inconsistency in our analysis. 
Our findings further show that PT provides a unified explanation for the two bidding 
behavior anomalies. We first empirically demonstrate the existence of the bidding behavior 
anomalies by using individual bidding information on more than 140,000 auctions. Our 
parameter estimates of the PT model, based on 538,045 auctions for 1,261 unique product IDs 
                                               
1 Yet the Federal Trade Commission notes that “in many ways, a penny auction [pay-per-bid auction] is more like a lottery than a traditional 
online auction” (http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0037-online-penny-auctions). 
2 Arkes and Blumer (1985, p.124) define the sunk cost effect as “a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, 
effort, or time has been made.” 
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from 30 different pay-per-bid auction sites, indicate that bidders are loss averse and 
overweight small probabilities. Applying the median estimates of the PT model to a 
representative pay-per-bid auction, we show that PT preferences lead to expected revenues 
that exceed the CRP by 25.46%. Decomposing the overall effect, we find that, relative to the 
CRP, risk preferences alone increase the expected revenue of the auction by 1.38%, loss 
aversion reduces the expected revenue by 35.38%, and probability weighting almost doubles 
expected revenue (91.30%). We further show that the PT model fits the data better than a 
competing model based on EUT, both in- and out-of-sample.  
 
2. Previous Literature 
2.1. Literature on Pay-per-Bid Auctions 
Pay-per-bid auctions (Kim et al. 2014; Reiner et al. 2014), also referred to as pay-to-bid 
auctions (Platt et al. 2013) or penny auctions (Augenblick 2016; Hinnosaar 2016), typically 
start at a price of $0.00, and each bid increases the price by a small fixed increment (e.g., 
$.01, $.02, $.12, $.24). A bidder pays a fee, often $.60 for every bid, and each bid extends the 
auction by a specific time (e.g., up to 20 seconds). The auction has a soft-close ending and 
ends if no new bid is placed before the countdown clock reaches zero. The bidder who placed 
the final bid wins the auction. The winner can then buy the product at the price of the final bid 
(i.e., the final price), which is usually much lower than the CRP.  
It is important to stress that, despite superficial similarities, pay-per-bid auctions are 
substantially different from well-known auction formats such as eBay. Whereas eBay 
auctions have a fixed duration, pay-per-bid auctions have an open end. They can end quickly 
if there are only a few bids, but they can also go on for a long time. In eBay auctions, only the 
winning bidder pays his or her bid, whereas in pay-per-bid auctions, all bidders, whether they 
7 
 
 
 
win or not, incur bidding fees. Whereas pay-per-bid auctions are modeled as a war of attrition, 
eBay auctions are theoretically similar to sealed-bid second price auctions, although 
Zeithammer and Adams (2010) show that the sealed-bid abstraction does not describe actual 
bidding behavior very well. 
The auctioneer is usually the seller of the product, and previous research shows that pay-
per-bid auction websites earn considerable profits (Augenblick 2016; Platt et al. 2013). The 
mirror image of high auctioneer profits is that bidders lose money on average. Given the bad 
expected outcome for bidders in pay-per-bid auctions and the negative media attention (see, 
e.g., Ayres 2008; Choi 2011), one would expect that the phenomenon of online pay-per-bid 
auctions would disappear. Yet pay-per-bid auction sites are still present and continue to enjoy 
popularity (see also Augenblick 2016).  
Independently from one another, Platt et al. (2013), Hinnosaar (2016), and Augenblick 
(2016) develop models that describe equilibrium bidding strategies in pay-per-bid auctions. 
Platt et al. (2013) and Augenblick (2016) demonstrate that in any SPNE that results in more 
than one bid, the bidders must use behavioral strategies. An equilibrium in behavioral 
strategies implies that a bidder (1) at every point in time is indifferent between placing a bid 
or not and (2) selects either of these two actions at random, such that the bidders in the 
preceding period (i.e., round) are indifferent between bidding and not bidding. Consequently, 
each bidder’s expected surplus from participating in the auction is zero, and the full surplus 
goes to the seller.3 
Platt et al. (2013) compare the results of actual auctions with the predicted results obtained 
under equilibrium bidding strategies to show that the actual number of bids is higher than the 
                                               
3 Hinnosaar’s (2016) model is similar to Augenblick’s (2016) and Platt et al.’s (2013) in many respects but differs in how ties are resolved. 
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predicted number of bids under risk neutrality. They then demonstrate that mild risk-seeking 
behavior explains this result. 
Augenblick (2016) uses the bidding history of pay-per-bid auctions to show that a bidder’s 
behavior depends on how many bids she has already placed earlier in the auction: the more 
bids placed, the greater the likelihood of placing additional bids in the same auction. This 
empirical observation is a typical example of the sunk cost fallacy. It contrasts with the SPNE, 
in which the probability of placing a bid varies only with the current auction price; the 
bidding fees a bidder has accumulated are considered sunk costs and therefore do not affect 
the decision to bid again. This characteristic also holds true for Platt et al.’s (2013) risk 
preference extension, which uses a utility function that assumes constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA). Augenblick (2016) uses a sunk cost fallacy model to explain this finding. 
Whereas Platt et al. (2013) cannot explain the sunk cost fallacy, Augenblick’s (2016) model is 
inconsistent with average revenues below the CRP, a common finding for pay-per-bid 
auctions (see Platt et al., 2013). 
Several studies offer alternative explanations for bidder behavior in pay-per-bid auctions. 
Byers et al. (2010) demonstrate that introducing asymmetric beliefs into Augenblick’s (2016) 
and Platt et al.’s (2013) risk-neutral models can lead to revenues that are larger than the CRP. 
This is also true when bidders underestimate the number of bidders in the auction and, 
therefore, overestimate the probability of winning. Wang and Xu (2016) show empirically 
that bidders’ strategic sophistication and experience positively affect their consumer surplus. 
Goodman (2012) uses signaling theory to explain aggressive bidding: if a bidder places many 
bids in auctions, she can acquire a reputation that deters other bidders from placing bids in 
future auctions in which this bidder is also active. As a result, this bidder could win future 
auctions at very low prices.  
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Caldara (2013) investigates pay-per-bid auctions in laboratory experiments. He finds that 
auction revenues are significantly larger than the values of the products being auctioned, even 
when the number of bidders, the bidding fee, and the value of the products are revealed to all 
participants. This result suggests that asymmetric beliefs about the parameters of the auction 
are not the main driver of auction revenues that are larger than the CRP. Moreover, Caldara 
finds that risk-seeking behavior does not significantly affect the probability of bidding, which 
casts doubt on explanations that rely purely on risk-seeking preferences. 
Our study extends Platt et al.’s (2013) and Augenblick’s (2016) baseline models by 
incorporating PT, a model that has been successfully employed in the literature to describe 
decision making under risk in a wide range of applications. Our PT model offers a unified 
explanation for (1) average revenues that differ from the product’s value and (2) the sunk cost 
fallacy. 
2.2. Literature on Prospect Theory 
Previous research has successfully used PT to explain a variety of phenomena in the field 
that cannot be explained with EUT (for an overview, see Camerer 2000). For example, Jullien 
and Salanié (1997) show that PT performs better than EUT in explaining horse race bettors’ 
behavior. In particular, probability weighting makes long shots more attractive and favorites 
less attractive relative to unweighted probabilities, the so-called favorite–long shot bias. 
Barberis (2012) uses PT to explain why a person enters a casino and gambles longer than 
initially intended. The author explicitly addresses the dynamic inconsistency and distinguishes 
three ways people address it: naive people are unaware of the dynamic inconsistency; 
sophisticated people without commitment know that their actions are not dynamically 
consistent, but they cannot commit to a specific plan of action; and sophisticated people with 
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commitment are aware of the dynamic inconsistency and can commit to a plan of action. We 
adopt this classification for our analysis. 
The majority of PT applications address situations in which people face exogenous risk. 
Only two studies examine PT in a strategic context in which risk arises endogenously as a 
result of strategic interaction: Goeree et al. (2003) use PT to explain individual behavior in 
experiments with asymmetric matching penny games, and Metzger and Rieger (2010) study 
the existence of Nash equilibria and their properties in games in which participants have PT 
preferences. 
The present study is the first to include PT (including probability weighting) in a dynamic 
and game theoretic model. A notable exception is Gnutzmann (2014) which also studies pay-
per-bid auctions using PT. The key differences between this study and ours is that in 
Gnutzmann (2014) (1) past bidding costs are immediately integrated in the reference point 
and do not affect current or future decisions; and (2) dynamic inconsistency is not explicitly 
addressed. Presumably, the lack of studies addressing PT preferences in dynamic games is 
due to the dynamic inconsistency that arises when departing from EUT and the nonexistence 
of the SPNE. Our study demonstrates that the backward solution, in combination with the 
assumption of sophisticated people without commitment, is a tractable solution concept. We 
show that sophisticated people with commitment do not take part in the auction in the first 
place and naive people behave similarly to sophisticated people without commitment. 
Our study also contributes to an extensive literature stream that involves estimating the 
parameters of PT. Beginning with Tversky and Kahneman (1992), numerous researchers have 
attempted to estimate the parameters for various PT specifications (for an overview of many 
of these parameter estimates, see Booij et al. 2010, Table 1). The majority of these studies use 
data from controlled laboratory experiments. Notable exceptions include Jullien and Salanié’s 
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(1997) work, which uses data from the betting market for horse races, and Gurevich et al. 
(2009), who employ U.S. stock option data. The present study applies a PT model of pay-per-
bid auctions to a large empirical data set of online auctions and as such is one of the few 
studies to empirically estimate PT parameter values in the field. 
 
3. The Model 
In this section, we develop a pay-per-bid auction model that extends Platt et al.’s (2013) 
and Augenblick’s (2016) models by considering that people (hereinafter labeled “bidders”) 
have PT preferences. The model assumes that one product is being sold in an auction. The 
product has a known common value to the bidders, denoted by υ. Note that we do not assume 
that all people value the product equally; in fact, people are likely to hold very different 
valuations for this product. But only those people with the highest valuation have an incentive 
to participate in the auction and, therefore, become bidders.4 Let n denote the number of 
bidders in the auction.  
The auction starts in period 0 at an auction price of 0. In period 0, bidders decide 
simultaneously whether to place a bid or not. Placing a bid entails a bidding fee b and 
increases the auction price by increment d > 0. We assume that the maximum number of bids 
represents a natural number, which means that (υ – b)/d is a natural number. If several bidders 
choose to bid in period 0, a fair random device determines which of the bidders makes the 
first bid and thereby incurs bidding fee b. The bidder who places the first bid becomes the 
leader in the next period (period 1). In period 1, the leader remains inactive, and the other 
                                               
4 This is analogous to the “one too many property” in the general war of attrition (Bulow and Klemperer, 
1999). If N + K firms compete for N prizes, the K – 1 least able firms will drop out immediately and N + 1 will 
compete for the N prizes. 
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bidders choose whether to bid. If one of the nonleaders chooses to bid, she incurs bidding fee 
b, the auction price increases by increment d, she becomes the leader in the next period, and 
the process described for period 1 is repeated. If none of the nonleaders chooses to bid, the 
auction ends, and the leader receives the product and pays the current auction price (i.e., the 
number of bids times the increment d). 
Although this auction can go on indefinitely, a critical number of bids exists after which 
choosing to bid is strictly dominated by not bidding. Consider a bidder who contemplates 
placing a bid at period t. If this bidder places a bid, her best outcome is that there are no more 
bids and she wins the auction and gains the right to buy the product for a price of td. When 
this price exceeds the value of the product net of the bidding fee (i.e., td > υ – b), the bidder 
does not want to place another bid even if she is sure of winning the auction. Thus, if the 
auction reaches period T = (υ – b)/d, the bidders who are not the current leader will not bid, 
and the auction ends. This observation leads to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: The number of bids in a pay-per-bid auction does not exceed T = (υ – b)/d. 
When bidders’ preferences can be described by EUT, we follow Platt et al. (2013) and focus on 
symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 
3.1. Solution with Expected Utility Theory 
Under EUT and risk neutrality, several equilibria exist in which the auction does not 
continue beyond period 1; in other words, there is either no bid at all or only one bid in the 
auction (namely, the one in period 0 because the auction ends in period 1). The most relevant 
SPNE for analyzing the empirical outcomes of online pay-per-bid auctions is the equilibrium 
that, at each period t < T, continues with positive probability pt. 
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Proposition 2: In the unique symmetric SPNE that reaches period T with positive 
probability, the probability that at least one bidder chooses to bid at period 0 < t < T is
t
b
p 1
t d
= −
− 
. In the general case, the probability p0 is not pinned down in equilibrium and 
can take any value between 0 and 1. 
For a proof, see Platt et al. (2013) and Augenblick (2016). Intuitively, a bidder is 
indifferent between placing a bid or not, if the probability of another bid in the subsequent 
period, pt, satisfies 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1t tp pb t d b=  + − − −  −  
Solving Equation (1) for pt yields the probability given in Proposition 2. 
If the probability to bid at the beginning of the auction, p0, is strictly below 1, there is a 
positive probability that the auction ends without a single bid and that the product remains 
with the auctioneer. These auctions are not represented in our data set. Therefore, we set p0 = 
1, thereby restricting attention to auctions that attracted at least one bid. In the SPNE 
described in Proposition 2, the probability that the auction ends after t bids given that it 
reaches t bids is equal to 
b
t d − 
. If p0 = 1, the expected revenue for the auctioneer is υ. 
If bidders have CARA preferences, the probability to bid is decreasing in the degree of risk 
aversion; i.e., risk seeking (averse) bidders, make more (fewer) bids and the expected revenue 
is above (below) υ (Platt et al., 2013). 
 
3.2. Derivation of Backward Solution with Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose PT as an 
alternative to EUT. Let the potential outcomes of a gamble be m 1 0 1 nx ,...,x ,x ,x ,...,x− −  and let 
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m 1 0 1 np ,..., p , p , p ,..., p− −  be the respective probabilities. The outcomes are arranged in 
increasing order such that i jx x , for i j , and 0x 0= . Under cumulative PT, a bidder’s 
valuation of such a gamble is as follows: 
(2) EV= ( )
n
i i
i m
x 
=−
 , 
where 
(3) ( )
( )
( )
i i
i
i i
f x for x 0,
x
f x for x 0,


 
= 
−  − 
 
(4)  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
i
i n i 1 n
i
m i m i 1
i
p , for i n,
p ... p p ... p , for 0 i n,
p ... p p ... p , for m i 0,
p , for i m,

 

 

+
− − −
 =

+ + − + +  
= 
+ + − + + −  
 = −
 
and 
(5)  ( )
( )( )
i
i 1
i i
p
p
p 1 p

 
 =
+ −
. 
The value function in Equation (3) captures the bidder’s loss aversion (λ) and risk 
preferences. The function f is strictly increasing and f(0) = 0. For concave f, the bidder is risk 
averse in the positive domain and risk seeking in the negative domain. A convex function 
implies risk seeking in the positive domain and risk aversion in the negative domain. 
However, loss aversion, λ > 1, implies that a loss decreases a bidder’s utility more than a gain 
of the same size increases her utility.  
Equation (3) implicitly assumes that the bidder’s reference point for determining whether 
an outcome is a gain or a loss is 0. In general, defining the right reference point is difficult in 
many situations (see Barberis 2013). Here, $0 is a natural candidate for the reference point: a 
“gain” (“loss”) implies buying the product for less (more) than the CRP, which is prominently 
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posted on the auction website. For our qualitative results, the assumption that the reference 
point is 0 can be relaxed. All theoretical results hold as long as the reference point is not fully 
readjusted after each bid to equal total bidding fees. 
Equation (4) defines the decision weights, which use the probability weighting function in 
Equation (5), where 0 < δ ≤ 1. The probability weighting function acknowledges the common 
observation that bidders overweight small and underweight large probabilities. As δ becomes 
lower, the overweighting of probabilities becomes greater. Note that the decision weights do 
not necessarily represent biased beliefs about the objective probabilities; PT is reduced to risk 
neutral EUT if f  is linear, λ = 1, and δ = 1 in Equations (2)–(5). 
It is well known that departing from EUT may induce a dynamic inconsistency (for a 
survey, see Machina 1989), which means that the intended actions at one point can differ 
across time. Consider the following example for a bidder with probability weighting. Let’s 
assume that after two bids have been made in an auction, the bidder is indifferent between 
making the third bid and not bidding. If that same bidder compared all possible plans of action 
before the start of the auction, the plan in which the bidder does not make the third bid is 
strictly preferred to plans that entail making the third bid. This bidder might make the third 
bid, although she ruled it out before the start of the auction.  
Thus, when studying PT in a dynamic situation, we must specify how bidders address this 
inconsistency in behavior across time. Following Barberis (2012), we distinguish three types: 
(1) naive bidders (i.e., bidders who are unaware of the dynamic inconsistency); (2) 
sophisticated bidders without commitment (i.e., bidders who know about the dynamic 
inconsistency but are unable to commit to their intended actions in the future); and (3) 
sophisticated bidders with commitment (i.e., bidders who are aware of the dynamic 
inconsistency and commit to their intended actions in the future). 
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Sophisticated bidders without commitment. We consider a pay-per-bid auction played by 
sophisticated bidders with the same PT preferences. Bidders are sophisticated in the sense that 
they know that they will make decisions in future periods that are not optimal from their 
current point of view. Moreover, they have no means to commit to the optimal strategy. As a 
result, they determine their strategy using a recursive process starting from the last period. In 
each period, nonleading bidders choose their probability of bidding such that the other bidders 
are indifferent in the preceding period. Let Ct–1 denote the bidding costs incurred up to period 
t. Note that, when n>2, there are several nonleading bidders and they will typically have 
accumulated different bidding costs. We will later show that under certain conditions the 
bidder with the highest accumulated bidding costs is most eager to bid and, thus, needs to be 
made indifferent. In that case Ct–1 represents the maximum accumulated bidding costs among 
the n-1 nonleading bidders. 
Proposition 3: In the backward solution that reaches period T with positive probability, 
the probability that a bid is placed at period 0 < t < T, pt, solves 
(6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
1
1 ,
0
t t t t t
t
f C p f C b p f d t C b
for d t C b
    

− − −
−
−  =  −  + + −  −  − −
−  − − 
 
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 11t t t t tf C p f C b p f d t C b  − − −=  + + −  − −  − −  otherwise. 
If f is linear, λ = 1, and δ = 1, Equation (6)  simplifies to Equation (1). The following 
proposition summarizes the effects of the PT parameters on the bidding probabilities obtained 
by backward induction: 
Proposition 4: In the backward solution in the neighborhood of risk neutral EUT, the 
probability that bidders with PT preferences place a bid is 
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• increasing for concave f at the beginning of the auction and decreasing for the 
remainder of the auction, 
• decreasing in the loss aversion parameter (λ) at the beginning of the auction and 
unaffected by λ for the remainder of the auction, and 
• decreasing in the probability weighting parameter (δ) except the last b/d periods, when 
it can be increasing in δ. 
The Appendix provides the proof for Proposition 4, and the following example illustrates its 
implications. 
Consider a pay-per-bid auction with two bidders, product value υ = 6, bidding fee b = 2, 
and price increment d = 1. According to Proposition 1, this auction has at most T = (6 – 2)/1 
= 4 periods. Both bidders have the same value function with f(x) = xα. We assume that both 
bidders choose to bid in period 0 and that one of them is randomly chosen to be the first 
leader. Table 1 presents the probabilities of bidding in periods 1–3. The first row presents the 
bidding behavior of a risk-neutral expected-utility maximizer. The parameter values for the 
PT models (PT1, PT2, and PT4) are based on the estimates (α = .88, δ = .65, λ = 2.25) 
obtained from Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) experimental study.5 The second-to-last row 
represents the behavior for risk-seeking preferences in the positive domain (PT3). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Under EUT with risk neutrality, the expected revenue of the auctioneer is 6. However, if 
bidders overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities (PT1), they bid 
                                               
5 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) obtain these estimates from experiments in which participants had to state a number that made them indifferent 
between two binary lotteries. Thus, we acknowledge the context is very different from the auction setting considered in the current study. Most 
notably, in Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment, the experimenter exogenously induced the risk that participants face and it does not depend 
on the choices of other participants. Nevertheless, we use these parameter estimates because they are often used in the literature. 
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more aggressively. Consequently, the auctioneer’s expected revenue is well above 6. Bidders 
who are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses (PT2) show a lower probability of 
bidding compared with risk-neutral bidders in periods 1 and 2. However, when bidders 
accumulate bidding fees, the risk-seeking part of the value function dominates, and the 
probability of bidding is higher than for risk-neutral bidders. Compared with risk-neutral 
expected-utility maximization, risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses (PT3) leads 
to a higher probability of bidding in the first period and to a lower probability of bidding in 
the final period. The expected revenue is higher than 6. Loss-averse bidders (PT4) also bid 
with smaller probabilities in periods 1 and 2; however, in period 3, all relevant payoffs are 
negative, and the effect of loss aversion is zero. Expected revenue is lower than 6 in this case. 
Naive bidders. For the analysis of a naive bidder’s behavior, let us assume that at least one 
bidder is unaware of the dynamic inconsistency and the other bidders are sophisticated 
without commitment. Let us fix the bidding behavior of these bidders at the bidding 
probabilities obtained in the previous section. How does a naive bidder respond? Ultimately, 
she behaves exactly like a sophisticated bidder: in each period in which the naive bidder is the 
nonleading bidder, she is indifferent between placing one more bid and not bidding. The 
crucial difference from a sophisticated bidder is that the naive bidder intends in period t to 
make exactly one bid and then stop bidding thereafter. However, in the next period in which 
the naive bidder is the nonleading bidder, period t + 2, she is again indifferent between 
making another bid and stopping. So, she might bid another time, and another time in the next 
nonleading period after that, and so on. However, had she known in period t that she would 
19 
 
 
 
make two or more bids in future periods, she would have chosen not to bid and thereby exit 
the auction in period t.6 
Proposition 5: Consider a pay-per-bid auction played by bidders with the same PT 
preferences. At least one of these bidders is naïve. If the probability that at least one bid is 
placed is given by Proposition 3, then 
• a naive bidder is indifferent between placing exactly one more bid and exiting the 
auction, and 
• a naive bidder prefers placing exactly one more bid to placing two more bids. 
The Appendix provides proof of Proposition 5. The intuition for the result that the naive 
bidder prefers placing only one bid to placing two or more bids is that a bidder with PT 
preferences likes the skewness of the payoff distribution and making only a single bid 
maximizes this skewness. Comparing the PT values associated with making one more bid and 
not bidding at all does not depend on the bidder being naive or sophisticated; thus, a naive 
bidder is indifferent between placing exactly one more bid and exiting the auction entirely. 
Sophisticated bidders with commitment. A sophisticated bidder with commitment chooses 
the plan of action over all periods up to period T that maximizes her PT valuation. The 
optimal strategy is to bid in the current period and then to stop bidding, because this plan of 
actions offers the highest skewness of the payoff distribution. Thus, a sophisticated bidder 
with commitment acts like a naive bidder intends to act, but unlike a naive bidder, she sticks 
to her intentions. Thus, we do not expect to encounter many sophisticated bidders with 
                                               
6 This distinction between naïve and sophisticated people is familiar from the present bias literature, pioneered in Strotz (1956). Naïve and 
sophisticated people have the same preferences over consumption in the present (holding future consumption constant), but they have different 
beliefs about their future consumption patterns. 
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commitment in pay-per-bid auctions for two reasons: First, there may not be good 
commitment devices that keep bidders from bidding again, so sophisticated bidders with 
commitment will choose not to participate at all, adhering to the philosophy of Gimein (2009) 
from the Washington Post, who writes, “The only winning strategy is not to play in the first 
place.”7 Second, even if they can commit to their strategy, they only make at most one bid and 
then exit. 
 
3.3. Effect of Past Bids on Bidding Behavior 
An important implication of EUT in combination with either risk neutrality or CARA is 
that a bidder’s behavior in the current period of the auction is independent of the bidding fees 
that she has already incurred in previous periods of the same auction, because accumulated 
bidding fees represent sunk costs that should not affect future decisions. Under PT, this is no 
longer true, as is summarized in the next proposition. This proposition uses a very general 
specification for the probability weighting function, ϖ(p). We make the following assumption 
about this function. 
Assumption (Subcertainty): The probability weighting function satisfies 
ϖ(p) +  ϖ(1 – p) ≤ 1 for all p   [0, 1]. 
The probability weighting function in Equation (5) satisfies the subcertainty assumption. 
Proposition 6: Suppose bidders’ PT preferences satisfy subcertainty. For any given 
probability of winning with the next bid, 
11 tp +− , a bidder who has already placed bids in 
                                               
7 In the case of casino gambling, a sophisticated person might only bring a limited amount of cash and no credit card as a commitment device 
(Barberis 2012). However, because bidding in online auctions is typically done at home with electronic payments, similar devices are not likely 
for pay-per-bid auctions. 
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previous periods of the auction is strictly more likely to place another bid than a bidder who 
has not yet placed a bid in the same auction if 
• f(x) is linear and 
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The Appendix provides expressions for ρ1 and ρ2. The ρs are ratios of the slopes of f at 
different points and, thus, are a measure of the curvature of f. Proposition 6 states that the sunk 
cost fallacy occurs if loss aversion and/or probability weighting is sufficiently strong. 
Note that Proposition 6 is derived holding the bidding probabilities of the other bidder 
constant; that is, for any given probability of winning with the next bid, a bidder’s expected 
valuation of the next bid is increasing in the number of bids the bidder has already made in 
that same auction.  
We next investigate how well this proposed PT model can explain bidder behavior in real-
world pay-per-bid auctions—that is, examine the applicability of the PT model.  
 
4. Data and Evidence for Pay-Per-Bid Auction Anomalies 
4.1. Data 
For our empirical analyses, we use a data set that tracked the activities of a large number of 
pay-per-bid auction websites.8 The data cover 965,403 auctions that occurred between 
November 19, 2009, and March 12, 2011, on 138 pay-per-bid auction sites with more than 1 
                                               
8 We thank the owner of the (currently inactive) website allpennyauctions.com, Mark Streich, for providing us with the data.  
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million unique bidders who placed over 100 million bids for 35,039 items. The data provide 
not only information about the auctions such as the CRP, the final price, the bid fee, and the 
number of bids (i.e., the price increment equals final price/number of bids), but also 
individual bidding histories for many of the auctions including bidder usernames.  
From these data, we use a subset, named Data Set 1—the auction data, which consists of 
all unique product IDs that show at least 75 auctions. By “unique product IDs,” we mean that 
we additionally split the original product IDs into different unique product IDs if the auctions 
contain different CRPs, increments, or bidding fees. In doing so, we ensure that the CRP, the 
increment, and the bidding fee are constant across the auctions for a certain unique product 
ID. We further discard all auctions that did not use U.S. dollars as currency and auctions for 
which the bidding increment and the final price were inconsistent. 
In total, Data Set 1 contains 538,045 auctions representing 1,261 products (as identified by 
the unique product ID) from 30 auction sites. Thus, we have on average 427 auctions per 
product. The CRPs (according to the pay-per-bid auctioneer) are in the range of $3.60 to 
$1,500, and the mean (median) CRP is at $56.93 ($37). Notably, the overall average revenue 
per auction is $131.98; thus, the total revenue over all 538,045 auctions corresponds to ≈ $71 
million. 
Table 2 summarizes several descriptive statics, such as the increments and bidding fees 
that are present in our data. In Table 2, we further distinguish between the average values in 
our data (i.e., “All Auctions”), the top five auction sites, which accumulate 89.1% of the 
observations, the average values of the data except for the top five sites (i.e., “All others”). 
The substantial differences across the auction sites in Table 2 (e.g., for the number of bidders, 
CRP, revenue) motivate a more disaggregate view across the auction sites.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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From the individual bidding histories, we derived Data Set 2—the bidding data. For Data 
Set 2, we use 142,650 auctions in which 285,312 unique bidders participated and placed more 
than 10 million bids. Data Set 2 contains detailed information corresponding to the bidders in 
each auction (e.g., the username associated with each individual bid). The availability of the 
individual bidding histories in Data Set 2 enables us to investigate the bidding behavior of 
bidders. In Data Set 2, we observe an average (median) number of 8.2 (3) bidders per auction, 
and the number of bidders per auction ranges from 1 to 1,020. Furthermore, Data Set 2 allows 
us to compute the average consumer surplus per auction and per bidder. The results illustrate 
that 21.06% of the bidders achieve a positive consumer surplus, and the majority (78.94%) of 
bidders realizes a negative consumer surplus (i.e., a loss). Further investigation of the data 
reveals that, on average, each bidder in our Data Set 2 loses $6.57 per auction. This finding 
provides evidence that the average bidder loses money when participating in pay-per-bid 
auctions. 
4.2. Evidence for Pay-per-Bid Auction Anomalies 
In the following subsections, we provide empirical evidence for the two aforementioned 
pay-per-bid auctions anomalies we use to illustrate the favorability of using PT over EUT.  
Average auctioneer revenues above the CRP. From Data Set 1, we can compute the 
average final price as well as the average revenue per auction. The ratio of average revenue 
and CRP is greater than 1 over all auction sites and for all auction sites individually. This 
finding indicates that pay-per-bid auctions raise revenues that are, on average, greater than the 
products’ CRPs, though there is considerable variation across auction sites: for the auction 
site QuiBids, the ratio is, for example, only 1.02, while for Beezid it is 4.45. Overall, we find 
for Data Set 1 that 46.54% of the auctions show average revenue above the CRP, while 
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53.46% of the auctions show revenues smaller than the CRP. In the PT model, average 
revenues above the CRP can be explained by risk-loving and probability weighting. High 
degrees of loss aversion can lead to average revenues below the CRP. 
Sunk cost fallacy. We use the individual bidding histories of Data Set 2 to document the 
sunk cost fallacy. To this end, we estimate a binary probit model using all auctions (N = 
14,790) that have at least 100 bids. The dependent variable is a dummy variable (D(id90 = 
id100)) that equals 1 if the identity of the bidder who made the 90th bid (id90) in a specific 
auction equals the identity of the bidder who made the 100th bid (id100) (i.e., both bids are 
placed by the same bidder). Independent variables are the bidding fees that bidder id90 has 
accumulated in the first 99 periods (C_id90) and the number of unique bidders (n) during the 
first 99 periods (i.e., modeled as 1/(n – 1)).9 
Under EUT with CARA preferences (with risk neutrality as a special case), the unique 
symmetric SPNE implies that each nonleading bidder is equally likely to make the 100th bid. 
The fees accumulated in the previous periods should not matter. Thus, under EUT with 
CARA preferences, we expect that β(1/(n–1)) = 1 and βC_id90 = 0. A positive value for βC_id90 > 0 
is evidence for the sunk cost fallacy. The results (see Table 3) show that βC_id90 is significantly 
positive (.05, p < .01), confirming that bidders’ bidding fees accumulated in previous periods 
increase the probability of placing a bid. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In our PT model, the sunk cost fallacy can be explained by loss aversion and/or probability 
weighting. 
                                               
9 We choose the 90th and 100th bid because it strikes a good balance between keeping the sample of auctions in the regression representative 
and generating enough variation in the accumulated bidding fees. The regression results are not sensitive to this choice. 
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4.3. Number of Bidders in Pay-per-Bid Auctions  
An important characteristic of pay-per-bid auctions for our proposed PT model is the 
number of bidders per auction. Table 2  shows that the average number of bidders per auction 
site varies from 2.5 to 18.8 bidders. To shed light on the distribution of the activity of bidders 
in the auctions, Table 4 illustrates the average percentages of bids per auction that come from 
the five top bidders—that is, the five bidders with the highest number of bids. To account for 
the variation of the number of bids per auction (mean = 76.12, median = 5, max = 27,380) in 
Data Set 2, we report the percentages for different minimum number of bids per auction. We 
find across all auctions, including those with only a few bids, that the top two bidders account 
for the vast majority of bids (Table 4, columns 2 and 3) and that these bids also translate into 
winning the most auctions (Table 4, column 7). However, observing the auctions that show a 
larger number of bids (≥75 and ≥100), we find that the percentages of bids from the top two 
bidders decrease to a range of approximately 40% and the top two bidders win approximately 
50% of the auctions.  
A further inspection of the data shows that 45.28% of all bidders across all auctions in 
Data Set 2 only place a single bid. These bidders could be classified as sophisticated bidders 
with commitment. In addition, 76.67% of all bidders in an auction place less than or equal to 
five bids. The fact that bidders who made only a few bids exit the auction altogether is 
consistent with Proposition 6. Due to loss aversion and/or probability weighting, bidders who 
have placed more bids are more eager to bid again and will drive bidders with fewer bids out 
of the auction. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Bringing the Model to the Data 
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5.1. Bidder assumptions 
Bidders’ sophistication. We make no assumption about the bidders’ sophistication. 
However, the theoretical analysis has shown that naïve bidders’ behavior is observational 
equivalent to the behavior of sophisticated bidders without commitment (Proposition 5) and 
that sophisticated bidders with commitment make at most one bid. We, therefore, use the 
backward solution obtained for sophisticated bidders without commitment for the estimation. 
Specification of the bidding fee function. Proposition 6 implies that bidders that have 
placed the most bids will be the most eager to place another bid. Consequently, the 
probabilities, pt, for t= 1, …, T-1 in Proposition 3 are chosen to make the bidders with the 
highest bidding costs indifferent between bidding or not. Table 4 shows that the top two 
bidders place on average 40% of all bids in an auction. We, therefore, assume that the actual 
bidding cost is one-fifth of the number of bids placed times the bidding fee, tC 0.2 t b=   .  
Robustness checks reveal that modifying the share of the bids placed by the top two bidders in 
the bidding fee function does not change our main results fundamentally. 
Specification of bidders’ valuations of the auctioned product. The products in our pay-per-
bid auctions are new products also offered by many other retailers. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
there are significant idiosyncratic differences in bidders’ valuations of the products. If bidders 
valued the product differently, the “one too many” property (see footnote 4) implies that all but 
the two bidders who value the product the most would drop out of the auction immediately. 
Consequently, we assume that bidders attach the same value to the product. 
Moreover, we assume that the bidders’ value is equal to the CRP. The CRP constitutes a 
clear upper bound for the value. No bidder will pay more for the product than she would pay 
at another retailer. In addition, pay-per-bid websites typically display the CRP prominently 
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for the duration of auction, suggesting that the CRP may serve as an anchor. We believe, 
therefore, that the CRP is a good proxy for the value. However, we are aware that the CRP 
reported on auction sites can overestimate the value of the product and we will discuss how 
inflating the value of the product affects our estimates. Alternatively, we could estimate the 
willingness to pay jointly with the other parameters of interest. Platt et al. (2013), however, 
show that this joint consideration does not improve the model fit considerably.  
Buy-Now option. By late 2009, most auction platforms added a new feature to their 
auctions called the Buy-Now option (Stix, 2012). With the Buy-Now option losing bidders 
can use their accumulated bidding fees to pay for the item they were bidding for. In other 
words, a bidder who has spent $C worth of bids in an auction that she eventually lost, can 
acquire the item for a price of $(CRP-C). Precise information on which auctions offered the 
Buy-Now option and how often it has been used is not available. But since our data starts in 
November 2009, the vast majority of auctions in our sample is likely to offer the Buy-Now 
option. The Buy-Now option changes the dynamics of the auction; it becomes a “game of 
chicken” (Byers et al., 2010). In the game of chicken, the auction end is not random. A bidder 
will continue to bid until the sum of her accumulated bidding fees and the current auction 
price are equal to the CRP at which point, she will use the Buy-Now option to buy the item. 
Thus, the bidder with the lowest accumulated bidding fees will be the last to bid and win the 
auction. All other bidders should either use the Buy-Now option or should not have taken part 
in the auction in the first place. 
These implications are not supported by the data: The auction end in our data appears to be 
random; the winning bidder is typically one of the bidders that have placed the most bids (not 
the least bids, see Table 4); and previous literature shows that only a few bidders exercise the 
Buy-Now option (on average 1.26 bidders per auction, Reiner et al., 2014). 
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There are (at least) two reasons why the game of chicken does not describe the data well. 
First, auction sites frequently offer auctions for voucher bid packs. Voucher bids can be used 
to bid in auctions just like purchased bids, the only difference being that voucher bids cannot 
be used towards buying the product using the Buy-Now option. Second, bidders might exhibit 
“narrow framing”. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that “people tend to consider decision 
problems one at a time, often isolating the current problem from other choices that may be 
pending.” This tendency has been confirmed in financial markets (Barberis et al., 2006 and 
Barberis and Huang, 2009). Thus, although bidders are aware of the Buy-Now option, they 
ignore it for the moment and concentrate on the pay-per-bid auction itself. 
As the game of chicken is inconsistent with several empirical facts of pay-per-bid auctions, 
we base our analysis on the traditional model of pay-per-bid auctions proposed by Augenblick 
(2016) and Platt et al. (2013). We are aware that ignoring the Buy-Now option can bias our 
estimates and we will return to this issue in the next section.  
Having made these assumptions, the value of placing a bid in period t is as follows: 
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The general results of the analysis are not affected by choosing Equation (9) over Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1992) original specification. However, we choose the exponential value 
function because it is closely related to the constant absolute risk aversion function used by 
Platt et al. (2013).10 Thus, any differences between the PT and the Platt model can then be 
attributed to PT rather than the functional form. For the probability weighting function 
𝜛(𝑝), and the decision weights 𝜋, we rely on Equations (2), (4), and (5). 
5.2. Description of Estimation Procedure 
We estimate the parameters (α, λ, δ) for each unique product ID using a maximum 
likelihood procedure. For a given unique product ID, we observe A different auctions. The ath 
auction ends after Ta bids. The likelihood of observing the final number of bids, (Ta )a=1…A, for 
this product is then given by 
(10) ( )1
1 1
1
a
a
TA
T t
a t
L p p+
= =
= −  , 
where the probabilities pt, t = 1, …, Ta + 1, are characterized by Proposition 3. We then 
determine the set of parameters (α, λ, δ) by minimizing the negative of the log-likelihood by 
means of a simulated annealing optimization (Xiang et al. 2013) that allows for a robust 
estimation of the three parameters. 
Note that the likelihood function in Equation (10) treats each auction as an independent 
observation. This assumption seems strong because identical products are also auctioned off in 
simultaneous auctions. Evidence from eBay shows that approximately 19% of bidders switch 
between simultaneous auctions (Anwar et al. 2006; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2010). 
                                               
10 Moreover, De Giorgi and Hens (2006) show that the exponential value function has several advantages over the power function; for example, 
the St. Petersburg paradox does not arise with the exponential value function, and the disposition effect can be explained with the exponential 
value function but not with the power function. 
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However, in our Data Set 2, only approximately 7% of bidders participate in more than one 
auction of identical products on the same day. Thus, cross-bidding on simultaneous auctions is 
less common in pay-per-bid auctions than in eBay auctions, presumably because bidding in 
pay-per-bid auctions requires much more active participation throughout the auction. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Empirical Results for the PT Model  
PT model results. Table 5 summarizes the parameter estimates for the PT model that yield 
the best fit for each of the 1,261 unique product IDs and displays the median, mean, and 
standard deviation of the estimated parameters α (risk preference), λ (loss aversion), and δ 
(probability weighting). We find that the median bidder is risk seeking for gains and risk 
averse for losses (see Table 5, column “All Auctions”) because the median value of the risk 
preference parameter α is –.002. Across the estimates for risk preferences, we find that 45.4% 
of estimates for α are positive, indicating that bidders for these products are risk averse for 
gains and risk seeking for losses. However, the majority of estimates, namely 688 (54.6%), 
are negative. For the loss aversion parameter, we find a median value of λ = 1.742, providing 
evidence that bidders are in general loss averse. This estimate implies that bidders perceive 
the pain of losing one dollar as strongly as the pleasure of gaining $1.74. For the probability 
weighting parameter (δ), we obtain a median value of δ = .864, indicating that the bidders 
overweight the small probability of winning the auction. The following example illustrates the 
impact of probability weighting: For a product with a CRP of $37, a bidding fee of $.6 and an 
increment of $.01, the probability of winning with the 3000st bid is 5.7%. A PT bidder with δ 
= .864 perceives this probability to be 8.1%. We observe that 11.4% of the estimates for 
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probability weighting are smaller than .7, indicating a strong overweighting of the 
probabilities of winning the auction. On the opposite side, we find that 20.7% of the estimates 
are very close to one (>.99).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
When looking at the disaggregated results for the top five auction sites, QuiBids stands out. 
QuiBids has a positive median value for the risk preferences, indicating that bidders are risk 
averse on this auction site, whereas we observe risk-seeking behavior on all other sites. 
QuiBids also shows the highest estimate for the probability weighting parameter and a rather 
low estimate for loss aversion. Notably, QuiBids is, in contrast to many other auction sites in 
our sample, still in business. Overall, the empirical parameter estimates of the PT model, 
combined with the results of the theoretical analysis, can explain the two anomalies observed 
for pay-per-bid auctions.  
Revenues well above the CRP. Bidders overweight small probabilities (median δ =.864). 
Proposition 4 indicates that this overweighting increases the probability of placing a bid and 
therefore increases the expected auction revenue. Moreover, bidders are loss averse (median 
λ = 1.742), which leads to fewer bids in the beginning of the auction and lower expected 
auction revenue. For the majority of products, the effect of probability weighting dominates 
the effect of loss aversion, such that the average revenues per auction exceed the CRP, but 
there are also products for which the average revenue per auction is below the CRP.  
Sunk cost fallacy. Proposition 6 states that the sunk cost fallacy occurs when loss aversion 
and probability weighting are large relative to the curvature of the value function. Our 
estimates support this proposition. The median estimate for λ is well above 1 and the median 
estimate for δ well below 1, whereas the median for α is close to 0, suggesting a value 
function that is almost linear. 
32 
 
 
 
Comparing our PT parameter estimates with previous estimates, we find that the average 
loss aversion parameter is between Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) original estimate (
  = 2.25) and Harrison and Rutström’s (2009) estimate (  = 1.38). Our estimates for the 
probability weighting parameter are larger, and therefore, our probability weighting is less 
pronounced than in most laboratory studies, in which δ ranges from .56 to .76 (see Booij et al. 
2010, Table 1). One exception is Harrison and Rutström (2009), who find an estimate of δ = 
.91. The only other estimates of the probability weighting parameter using field data come 
from Gurevich et al. (2009) and are comparable to ours (δ = .77 and δ = .91).  
Estimates of the parameter of the value function typically support the traditional S-shaped 
value function, which is concave in gains and convex in losses. Our estimates, however, 
imply the opposite pattern for the majority of auctions: the value function is convex in gains 
and concave in losses. The finding that bidders in pay-per-bid auctions are risk seeking in 
gains is consistent with Platt et al.’s (2013) results and implies that bidders in pay-per-bid 
auctions are more risk seeking than participants in laboratory studies. Moreover, even some 
laboratory studies (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2008; Bruhin et al. 2010) find that people are risk 
averse in losses.  
Decomposing the overall effect of Prospect Theory into its individual components. 
Proposition 4 provides the qualitative effects of the PT parameters on bidding behavior and, 
consequently, expected revenues. Using the parameter estimates from the previous subsection, 
we can now quantify these effects on expected revenues. To this end, we perform the 
following simulation exercise. We consider a product with a CRP of $37 that is auctioned off 
in a pay-per-bid auction with a bidding fee of $.60 and an increment of $.01. (These numbers 
represent the median values for CRP, bidding fee, and increment in Data Set 1, respectively.) 
We next calculate the expected revenues that result from setting the PT parameters to their 
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median estimates one at a time, while leaving the two remaining parameters at their risk-
neutral EUT values. In addition, we calculate expected revenues assuming that all PT 
parameters are set to their median estimates. If all PT parameters are at their risk-neutral EUT 
levels, expected revenue is equal to the CRP. Table 6 presents the results of this 
decomposition. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Risk preferences alone, with α = –.002, lead to expected revenues that exceed the CRP by 
1.38%, a very modest effect on expected revenues. A median level of loss aversion, however, 
reduces expected revenues by 35.38% compared with the CRP. Probability weighting has by 
far the largest individual impact. When setting δ to its median estimate of .864, expected 
revenues amount to almost twice the CRP (91.30%). Taken together, the three components of 
PT lead to expected revenues that exceed the CRP by 25.46%. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the auction duration (measured by the number of bids) implied by 
the estimated PT model compares with the empirical auction duration. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Although the two items (a temperature gauge and a voucher bid pack) have differently 
skewed empirical distributions, the PT model maps them well. 
6.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the following we will analyze how sensitive our parameter estimates are with respect to 
some of the assumptions we made in Section 5.  
Bidders’ valuation of the product. The CRPs that auction sites set are typically higher than 
the prices on other online shopping websites, like Amazon (Augenblick, 2016, Platt et al., 
2013). A sensitivity analysis shows that if a product’s CRP is biased upwards by 25%, α is 
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biased upwards by 21%, δ is biased upwards by 4% and λ is biased downwards by .8% (the 
changes for λ are insignificant). We, therefore, believe that our estimates for α and δ are 
biased upwards and provide an upper bound for the PT parameters.  
The bias in the bidders’ valuation can also shed some light on the heterogeneity of the 
parameter estimates across items. Many items that are auctioned off are vouchers. These can 
be gift cards or voucher bid packs that can be used to bid on that same auction website. The 
CRPs of voucher auctions are usually set at the nominal value of the gift card or voucher bid 
pack and are, therefore, good proxies for the bidders’ valuation, whereas the CRPs of product 
auctions tend to be inflated. Consistent with this, we find that voucher auctions show 
significantly lower estimates for α and δ than product auctions; this is particularly pronounced 
for voucher bid auctions. There is no significant difference in the estimates for λ between 
voucher auctions and product auctions. Further evidence for this difference between voucher 
auctions and product auctions is the auction site Beezid. In our sample 99.4% of the auctions 
on Beezid are voucher bid auctions. In line with the result that voucher bid auctions show 
significantly lower estimates for α and δ than product auctions, Beezid is the auction site with 
the lowest α and δ estimates (see Table 5). 
Buy-Now option. To understand how sensitive our parameter estimates are to the Buy-Now 
option, we compare our parameter estimates with estimates using a data set of auctions 
without the Buy-Now option. This data set for the auction site Swoopo is described in Byers 
et al. (2010). The data in Byres et al. (2010) contains auctions from before and after the 
introduction of the Buy-Now option and thus allows for dividing the data into two subsets 
with and without the Buy-Now option. Using a regression approach that controls for factors 
such as CRP, bidding fee and increment, we find no significant difference for α and δ between 
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our estimates and the estimates using the Swoopo data before Buy-Now was introduced. Our 
estimates for λ are significantly higher than those for the Swoopo data without Buy-Now 
option. But there is no significant difference between the Swoopo auctions with and without 
Buy-Now option, suggesting that the difference to our results is not directly attributable to the 
Buy-Now option. 
6.3. Comparison of Results of PT and EUT Models 
To illustrate the suitability of using PT preferences for describing bidder behavior in pay-
per-bid auctions, we compare the PT model and the model proposed by Platt et al. (2013), an 
EUT model using a CARA utility function to incorporate risk preferences (hereinafter, the 
Platt model). The Platt model predicts the patterns of pay-per-bid auctions well and therefore 
serves as a strong benchmark. 
Therefore, we estimate the Platt model for the 1,261 unique product IDs in our Data Set 1. 
For the estimation of the risk preference parameter (denoted by αP for the Platt model), we 
again assume that the product value corresponds to the CRP and use the same estimation 
procedure used for the PT model. The results for the Platt model show, in the median, risk-
seeking preferences (median αP = –.004 [mean αP = .017]); however, we find that 39.65% of 
the estimates are positive, therefore indicating risk-averse preferences.  
The PT model results in a better log-likelihood than the Platt model for 1,226 of the 1,261 
unique product IDs (97.22%). Note that the PT model has three parameters, whereas the Platt 
model has only one. We, therefore, use the AIC and BIC criteria to compare the two models. 
Based on AIC (BIC), the PT model describes 77.4% (59.7%) of the unique product IDs better. 
In addition, we conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. To do so, we use the model 
estimations to generate the corresponding distributions of ending bids described by the PT and 
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Platt models. We then compared these distributions against the empirical observed data 
distributions. We find that the PT model fits the observed data distributions better than the 
Platt model. The PT model maps 80.65% of the observed data distributions (p > .05), while 
the Platt model only maps 43.3%. Comparing the two models, we find that the PT model 
maps 472 products that are not explained by the Platt model, the Platt model maps only one 
product that is not explained by the PT model, and the models describe 545 products equally 
well. 
6.4. Managerial Implications 
Auction increments. One of the auctioneer’s key decisions is to specify the increment for the 
auctions, aiming for the maximum revenue. Under EUT with risk neutrality, the auctioneer’s 
expected revenue is the CRP and, hence, independent of the bidding fee and the increment. 
Under PT, these details of the auction design do affect the auctioneer’s expected revenue, as 
we illustrate with the following simulation. 
We assume a product with a CRP of $37 and a bidding fee of $.60. The product is 
auctioned off with two different increments, $.01 and $.02. We further assume that bidders 
have PT preferences best described by the median parameter estimates provided in Table 5. 
For both increments, the revenues of these simulated auctions show average revenues above 
the CRP, and they are higher for the $.01 increment (25.47% above the CRP, or $46.42) than 
for the $.02 increment (24.37% above the CRP, or $46.02).  
We next analyze whether our data support the prediction of the PT model, that average 
revenues are ceteris paribus higher for the $.01 increment than the $.02 increment. There are 
16 products that are auctioned off with $.01 and $.02 increments and for which we observe 
more than 75 auctions for each increment. The bidding fee is $.6 for all these auctions. 
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Averaging over these 16 products, the average revenue of the auctions with a $.01 increment 
is 23.19% (median = 24.91%) above the CRP. For the auctions with a $.02 increment, the 
average revenue is 9.05% (median = 19.90%) above the CRP. A t-test shows that the average 
revenues are significantly greater for the $.01 increments (p-value: .006). This finding 
confirms the implication of the PT model, that the auctioneer can increase her expected 
revenue by reducing the increment. 
These 16 items offer a good opportunity to study the consistency of the parameter 
estimates with respect to changes in the auction design details.11 Table 7 shows that the 
differences between parameter estimates for the $.01 and $.02 increments are small 
(especially for δ and λ) and insignificant. Thus, an auctioneer can indeed estimate the 
parameters for one increment and use these estimates to make predictions for different levels 
of the increment. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                               
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this consistency check. 
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Prediction of revenue of auctions. Auctioneers are also interested in predicting revenues for 
upcoming auctions. To test the predictive power of our PT model, we split the data from Data 
Set 1 in two parts: a training data set (i.e., 80% of the auctions belonging to each unique 
product) and a holdout sample (i.e., the remaining 20% of the auctions belonging to each 
unique product). We use the training data to estimate the PT and Platt models as explained 
previously. We then use the model estimates per unique product to predict the average auction 
revenue. Last, we compare the predicted auction revenues with the observed revenues of the 
holdout sample (normalized by the CRP). We find that the RMSE of the PT model prediction 
is .616, which is superior to the RMSE prediction of the Platt model (mean = .672).  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
We incorporate PT preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model of pay-per-bid 
auctions. The novel feature of this application of PT is that risk arises endogenously as 
bidders employ mixed strategies. We derive the effects of the elements of PT (risk preference 
[α], loss aversion [  ], and probability weighting [δ]) on bidding behavior using a backward 
solution. Probability weighting implies that bidders overestimate the probability to win and 
therefore bid more often than a bidder with EUT preferences would bid. Loss aversion, in 
contrast, makes bidders bid more cautious. Both probability weighting and loss aversion are 
responsible for the sunk cost fallacy (i.e., the behavior that bidders who have already placed 
bids during an auction are more likely to bid in subsequent periods than bidders who have not 
yet bid in the auction). 
Using a data set covering 538,045 pay-per-bid auctions, we show that PT provides a good 
description of the observed bidding behavior and better fits the data than a competing model 
based on EUT. Our (median) parameter estimates of the PT model confirm that bidders are 
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risk seeking in gains (α = –.002) and loss averse (   = 1.742) and that they overweight small 
probabilities (δ = .864). Taking all three PT components together, for a representative pay-
per-bid auction we observe a 25.46% increase in revenues. A decomposition of the overall 
effect of PT into its individual components highlights that this increase in revenues is 
predominantly attributable to probability weighting. The parameter estimates from the PT 
model can further be used to predict future auction results for the same product well. 
Moreover, we find that lower increments, on average, are associated with higher revenues.  
The broader question that our study addresses is that of the universality of PT and its 
applicability for modeling behavior in strategic situations. Is PT only useful to describe risk 
attitudes toward lottery-like, exogenous risk, or is it also an effective descriptive theory of 
behavior in strategic situations in which risk arises endogenously? The encouraging findings 
of this study indicate that the success of PT as a descriptive theory of decision making under 
risk extends to situations in which risk arises through the interactions of different people. 
Moreover, many worthwhile applications of PT in dynamic games remain for researchers 
to explore. Returning to our introductory volunteer’s dilemma example, a PT model similar to 
that presented here predicts that the expected duration of a meeting is longer than one would 
expect using standard models with risk-neutral EUT preferences. The PT model also offers 
guidance for how to reduce the expected duration of the meeting: if a manager wants to 
decrease meeting time by finding a volunteer faster, then she should make sitting in the 
meeting as costly as possible for the members. An increase in “cost” could be achieved by 
scheduling the meeting near the end of the working day or by providing uncomfortable chairs 
or even no chairs at all. 
Our study also has implications for the online pay-per-bid auction industry. Several studies 
argue that pay-per-bid auction websites generate average revenues above the CRP because 
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bidders are inexperienced or naive (Augenblick 2016; Wang and Xu 2016). Under this 
assumption, as soon as bidders gain experience and no new inexperienced bidders arrive, pay-
per-bid auctions will cease to be profitable. One might, therefore, conclude that online pay-
per-bid auctions are a short-lived phenomenon. However, traffic data from the largest pay-
per-bid auction sites indicate that they still enjoy popularity (for further evidence, see 
Augenblick 2016 and quibids.com). We show that bidding behavior in online pay-per-bid 
auctions is consistent with the backward solution of a dynamic game with sophisticated PT 
bidders. Therefore, online pay-per-bid auctions with substantial positive profits for the 
auctioneer are not a transitory phenomenon. 
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Table 1: Bidding Probabilities and Expected Revenue according to Expected Utility Theory 
and Prospect Theory for a Pay-per-Bid Auction with υ = 6, b = 2, and d = 1  
p1 p2 p3 Expected 
Revenue 
EUT (α = 1, δ = 1, λ = 1) 
(bidders are risk neutral) 
60.0% 50.0% 33.3% 6.00 
PT1 (α = 1, δ = 0.65, λ = 1) 
(bidders weight probabilities) 
65.1% 50.0% 31.5% 6.24 
PT2 (α = 0.88, δ = 1, λ = 1) 
(bidders are risk-averse) 
58.8% 50.0% 35.2% 5.96 
PT3 (α = 1.12, δ = 1, λ = 1) 
(bidders are risk-seeking) 
61.2% 50.0% 31.5% 6.04 
PT4 (α = 1, δ = 1, λ = 2.25) 
(bidders are loss-averse) 
57.1% 30.8% 33.3% 4.69 
Notes: p1–p3 refer to the equilibrium bidding probabilities (i.e., the probability 
of bidding in period t).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Data Sets 1 and 2  
Auction Site All Auctions Quibids BidCactus BigDeal SkoreIt Beezid All Others 
Number of auctions 538,045 240,176 102,482 54,071 49,254 33,333 58,729 
Number of unique products 1261 614 112 165 120 13 237 
Average number of biddersa 8.2 2.5 4 18.8 5.5 4.4 9.2 
Average CRP (in $) 56.93 28.79 67.41 92.94 83.06 53.57 100.62 
Median CRP (in $) 37 21 50 37.5 50 40 45 
Average revenue (in $) 131.98 41.53 98.8 580.19 165.58 133.7 117.98 
Median revenue (in $) 29.44 12.81 47.12 39.52 58.88 88.81 39.05 
Average revenue/CRPb  1.64 1.02 1.22 4.22 1.64 4.45 1.49 
Median revenue/CRPb  1.15 .91 1.1 2.98 1.55 4.73 1.32 
Prob(Rev/CRP)>1 .6 .43 .64 .84 .82 1 .72 
Increments (in cents) 1; 2; 37 1; 2 1 1 1; 2 1; 37 1; 2 
Bidding fees (in cents) 14; 48; 50; 
55; 57; 60; 
63; 65; 70; 
72; 75; 87; 
89; 100 
60 75 75 63 70 14; 48; 50; 
55; 57; 60; 
63; 65; 70; 
72; 75; 87; 
89; 100 
aAverage number of bidders is calculated using the bidding histories of Data Set 2, bAverage and median revenue 
is calculated per unique product ID, all other numbers are on the auction level.  
Notes: CRP = current retail price, “All auctions” covers all auctions of all auction sites, “All Others” are all 
auctions except the top five sites (Quibids, BidCactus, BigDeal, SkoreIt, and Beezid). 
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Table 3: Probit Estimation Results Providing Evidence for the Sunk Cost Fallacy  
  Estimate SE z Value p-Value sig. 
Intercept –1.2856 .0253 –50.90 <.001 *** 
1/(n – 1)  3.8996 .3412 11.43 <.001 *** 
C_id90 .0503 .0012 41.44 <.001 *** 
***p < .01.    
Notes: SE = standard error, C_id90 = bidding fees that bidder id90 
has accumulated in the first 99 periods, 1/(n – 1) = number of unique 
bidders (n) during the first 99 periods, Number of observations = 
14,790.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Percentage of Bids of Top Five Bidders 
  
 Percentage of Bids of Top Percentage 
of Auctions 
Won by Top 
Two Bidders 
(%) 
  
 Five Bidders (%)a 
 N 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
All auctions 142,650 54.54 28.80 15.45 10.28 7.46 89.61 
Auctions with ≥75 bids 17,407 27.00 18.09 10.49 7.39 5.53 52.20 
Auctions with ≥100 bids 14,790 26.04 17.35 10.36 7.40 5.57 49.61 
aPercentage of the top bidders = number of bids from one bidder per auction / number of observed bids from 
all bidders per auction, N = number of observations. 
Notes: This table is based on Data Set 2. Averaging across auctions can lead to row sums greater than one. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates of PT Model 
Auction 
Site   
All  
Auctions QuiBids BidCactus BigDeal SkoreIt Beezid 
All 
Others 
Number of 
Unique 
Products   1,261 614 112 165 120 13 237 
Probability  
Weighting 
(δ) 
Mdn 0.864 0.946 0.814 0.712 0.835 0.704 0.838 
M 0.853 0.909 0.820 0.749 0.837 0.686 0.812 
SD 0.128 0.098 0.076 0.114 0.086 0.080 0.166 
Risk  
Preference 
(α) 
Mdn -0.002 0.011 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.054 -0.004 
M 0.025 0.049 -0.008 0.012 -0.009 -0.064 0.008 
SD 0.095 0.110 0.020 0.065 0.016 0.053 0.102 
Loss  
Aversion 
(λ) 
Mdn 1.742 1.199 4.533 3.574 2.281 1.045 2.963 
M 3.718 2.591 5.582 4.648 3.927 4.135 4.981 
SD 3.498 2.822 3.735 3.432 3.455 3.978 3.983 
Notes: Data Set 1 serves to estimate parameters, Mdn = median, M = mean, SD = standard 
deviation, “All Auctions” covers all auctions of all auction sites, “All Others” are all auctions 
except the top five sites (Quibids, BidCactus, BigDeal, SkoreIt, and Beezid).  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of the Overall Effect of Prospect Theory into its Individual 
Components 
  
Risk 
Preference 
(α) 
Loss 
Aversion (λ) 
Probability 
Weighting (δ) 
Expected 
Revenue ($) 
Change in 
Revenue (in %) 
Risk neutral EUT model 0 1 1 37.00 .00 
Bidders are risk seeking –.002 1 1 37.51 1.38 
Bidders are loss averse 0 1.742 1 23.91 –35.38 
Bidders’ weight probabilities 0 1 .864 70.78 91.30 
PT-Model (Median results) –.002 1.742 .864 46.42 25.46 
Notes: Current Retail Price = $37, bidding fee = $.60, increment = $.01. 
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Table 7: Average Parameter Estimates for Different Increments 
 Increment  
  $0.01 $0.02 p-value 
Risk preference (α) -0.0294 0.0007 0.2542 
Probability weighting (δ) 0.821 0.8025 0.2099 
Loss aversion (λ) 3.4055 3.3904 0.1964 
Notes: The p-value is based on a paired Wilcox rank sum test.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Empirical versus Estimated Distribution of Auction Duration (in Number of Bids) 
 
Notes: The empirical distribution is indicated by bars and the solid line represents the estimated distribution. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The general principle for the solution with PT preferences is the same as for the case with 
risk neutral EUT preferences. In each period, bidders choose their probabilities to bid such 
that bidders in the previous period are indifferent between bidding and not bidding. Equation 
(4) gives these indifference conditions. The conditions in Equation (4) implicitly assume that 
preferences satisfy compound independence. Compound independence allows us to replace 
the PT value of a subgame that follows a decision node with the PT value of its certainty 
equivalent. Dekel et al. (1991) show that compound independence guarantees dynamic 
consistency.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
Part 1 
Assume that δ = λ = 1. Consider first the case in which t is small, such that υ – td – b – Ct ≥ 
0. A risk neutral bidder is indifferent between bidding or not when 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )t 1 t t 1 t t 1C p C b 1 p d t C b .− − −− = − − + −  −  − −  
For any strictly concave function f, we have 
(12) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t 1 t t 1 t t 1f C p f C b 1 p f d t C b− − −−   − − + −  −  − − . 
Rearranging this equation leads to 
(13) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
t t 1 t t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1
p f C b 1 p f d t C b f C
f C f C p f C b f C b
− − −
− − − −
−  + + −  −  − − +
 + − −  + + − −
  
The left-hand side is the valuation a PT bidder with δ = λ = 1, and concave f attaches to 
making another bid over not bidding. When the right-hand side is negative, inequality (13) 
implies that the bidder’s valuation of another bid is negative. To make the bidder indifferent 
between bidding and not bidding, pt needs to decrease. The right-hand side is negative when 
(14) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t 1 t 1
t
t 1 t 1
f C f C
p
f C b f C b
− −
− −
+ −

+ + − −
. 
This condition is typically satisfied, especially after a few bids have been placed. 
Now consider the case in which t is large, such that ν – t∙d – b – Ct < 0. For any strictly 
concave function f; the function g(x) ≡ –f(–x) is strictly convex. Thus, we have 
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(15) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )t t 1 t t 1 t 1p f C b 1 p f d t C b f C− − −−  + − −  − −  − −  − . 
The valuation a PT bidder with δ = λ = 1 and concave f attaches to making another bid is 
greater than the valuation of not bidding. To make the bidder indifferent between bidding and 
not bidding, pt needs to increase. The effects of a convex function f on the bidding probability 
can be derived similarly. 
Part 2 
Assume that δ = 1. Consider first the case in which t is small, such that td t b C 0 −  − −  . The 
probability to bid is characterized by the following indifference condition: 
(16) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t 1 t t 1 t t 1f C p f C b 1 p f d t C b  − − −−  =  −  + + −  −  − − . 
Rearranging Equation (16) yields  
(17) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t 1 t 1
t
t 1 t 1
f C f d t C b
p
f C b f d t C b
 
 
− −
− −
 + −  − −
=
 + + −  − −
. 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields the following: 
(18) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
t 1 t 1 t 1t
2
t 1 t 1
f C b f C f d t C bp
f C b f d t C b

  
− − −
− −
+ −  −  − −
= −
  + + −  − −
, 
which is negative. When t is large, such that td t C b 0 −  − −  , all possible outcomes are in the 
loss domain Therefore, λ cancels out and has no effect on the bidding probability tp . 
Part 3 
Assume that f(x) = x and λ = 1. Consider first the case in which t is small, such that 
td t C b 0 −  − −  . The probability of bidding is characterized by the following indifference 
condition: 
(19) 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )t tt 1 t 1 t 11 1
t t t t
p 1 p
C C b d t C b
p 1 p p 1 p
 
 
  
− − −
−
− = −  + +  −  − −
+ − + −
. 
Using the implicit-function rule, we obtain the derivative of the probability pt with respect 
to δ around the point δ = 1: 
(20) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t tt
1
1 p log 1 p d t b p log p bp
d t


 
=
−  −  −  − −  
=
 − 
. 
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This derivative is negative if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t1 p log 1 p d t b p log p b−  −  −  −    . Using 
t
b
p 1
d t
= −
− 
 for δ = 1, this condition simplifies to υ–d∙t–2∙b>0. Because we consider the case 
in which td t C b 0 −  − −  , this condition is satisfied. 
Now consider the case in which t is large, such that td t b C 0 −  − −  . The indifference 
condition is then given by 
(21) 
( )( )
( )
( )( )
t t
t 1 t 1 t 11 1
t t t t
p p
C C 1 ( d t C b )
p 1 p p 1
b
p
 
   
− − −
 
 
 − = −  + −  −  − −
 
+ − + − 
+
 
, 
which simplifies to 
(22) 
( )( )
t
1
t t
p b
1 .
d t
p 1 p

  
= −
− 
+ −
 
Using the implicit-function rule, we obtain the derivative of the probability pt with respect to 
δ around the point δ = 1: 
(23) ( ) ( )( )t 1 t t t t
p
p 1 p log 1 p / p .

=

=  −  −

 
This derivative is negative if 1–pt>pt or pt<1/2. Using t
b
p 1
d t
= −
− 
for δ = 1, this condition 
becomes 
2 b
t
d
 − 
 . Therefore, t 1
p
0

=



, for t 2 b0,
d
 −  
  
 
, and t 1
p
0

=



, for t 
2 b b
,
d d
 −  − 
  
 
. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Part 1 
We show that a naïve bidder prefers to make exactly one bid instead of placing two bids; 
that is, 
(24) ( ) ( )t t t 2 t t t 2 t 4EV p 1, p 0 EV p 1, p 1, p 0 .+ + += =  = = =  
Consider first the case in which t is small such that ( ) tt 3 d 2 b C 0 − +  −  −  : 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t 2 t 1 t t 1 tEV p 1, p 0 1 p f t 1 d C b p f C b   + + += = = −  − +  − − +  −  +  
and 
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(26) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t t t 2 t 4 t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t 3 t 1 t
t 1 t 3 t
EV p 1, p 1, p 0 1 p f t 1 d C b
1 p p 1 p 1 p f t 3 d C 2 b
p p f C 2 b .
 
  
 
+ + +
+ + + +
+ +
= = = = −  − +  − −
 + − +  − − −  − +  − − 
 
+   −  + 
 
Inequality (24) becomes 
(27) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 3 t 1
t t 1 t 3 t
p f C b 1 p p 1 p 1 p
f t 3 d C 2 b p p f C 2 b .
   
  
+ + + + +
+ +
  −  +  − +  − − −
 
 − +  − −  +   −  + 
 
We know from Proposition 3 that a sophisticated bidder without commitment chooses pt+3 
such that 
(28) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )t t 3 t t 3 tf C b p f C 2 b 1 p f t 3 d C 2 b    + +−  + =  −  +  + −  − +  − −  . 
Multiplying Equation (28) by ( )1tp +  and plugging into Inequality (27) yields 
(29) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t 1 t 3 t 1 t 1 t 3 t
t 1 t 3 t 1 t 3 t
1 p p 1 p 1 p p 1 p f t 3 d C 2 b
p p p p f C 2 b .
    
   
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
 − +  − − − +  −  − +  − − 
 
   −   −  +  
 
Since ( ) ( ) ( )p q p q     , for every p, q  [0,1], the right-hand side of this inequality is 
negative. Thus, 
(30) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )t 1 t 1 t 3 t 1 t 1 t 31 p p 1 p 1 p p 1 p   + + + + + +− +  −  − +  −  
is a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold. For the case ( ) tt 3 d C 2 b 0 − +  − −   , 
inequality (30) holds for all reasonable levels of probability weighting. E.g. when δ =0.7 
inequality (30) holds when the weighted probabilities ( )1tp +  and ( )3tp +  are greater than 
0.348. When ( ) tt 3 d C 2 b 0 − +  − −   , ( )1tp +  and ( )3tp +  cannot be below f(Ct +b)/f(Ct+2b), 
which is greater than 0.348, unless the function f  is highly convex. 
Now consider the case where ( ) td t 1 C 2 b 0 −  + − −   . 
(31) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t 2 t 1 t t 1 tEV p 1, p 0 1 p f t 1 d C b p f C b    + + += = = −  −  − − +  − − +  −  +
and 
(32) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t t t 2 t 4 t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t 3 t
t 1 t 3 t
EV p 1, p 1, p 0 1 p f t 1 d C b
p p p f t 3 d C 2 b
p p f C 2 b .
  
   
 
+ + +
+ + +
+ +
= = = = −  −  − − +  − −
 + −   −  − − +  − −  
+   −  + 
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Inequality (24) becomes 
(33) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 3 t
t 1 t 3 t
p f C b p p p f t 3 d C 2 b
p p f C 2 b .
     
 
+ + + +
+ +
  −  +  −   −  − − +  − −  
+   −  + 
 
We know from Proposition 3 that a sophisticated bidder without commitment chooses pt+3 
such that 
(34) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )t t 3 t t 3 tf C b p f C 2 b 1 p f t 3 d C 2 b     + +−  + =  −  +  + −  −  − − +  − −   
Multiplying Equation (34) by ( )1tp +  and plugging into Inequality (33) yields 
(35) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t 3 t t 1 t 3 t
t 1 t 1 t 3 t t 1 t 3 t
p p f C 2 b p 1 p f t 3 d C 2 b
p p p f t 3 d C 2 b p p f C 2 b .
      
     
+ + + +
+ + + + +
  −  +  +  −  −  − − +  − − 
  −   −  − − +  − −  +   −  +  
 
Simplifying Inequality (35) yields the following condition: 
(36) ( )t 3
d

+  , 
which is satisfied for all t ≤ T. 
Part 2 
Given part (1) a naïve bidder’s decision to bid or not is the same as that of a sophisticated 
bidder without commitment. Consequently, the naïve bidder is also indifferent between 
bidding or not. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Part 1 
( )f x x= : A bidder who has not yet placed a bid in the auction is indifferent between 
bidding at time t or not if 
(37) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t 1 t 11 p d t b p b 0   + +−  −  − +  −  = . 
If a bidder has already accumulated bidding fees of tC , with td t b C 0 −  − −  , her 
valuation of another bid is 
(38) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t
t
1 p d t C b p C b
1 p d t b 1 p C p b p C
1 p C p C
1 p p C
C .
   
      
  
  

+ +
+ + + +
+ +
+ +
−  −  − − +  −  +
= −  −  − − −  +  −  +  − 
= − −  +  − 
  − +  −  
 − 
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Inserting Equation (37) into Inequality (38) yields the second equality, and the two 
inequalities use loss aversion, λ ≥ 1, and subcertainty, respectively. 
If a bidder has already accumulated bidding fees of tC , with td t b C 0 −  − −  , her 
valuation of another bid is 
(39) 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t
t
1 p d t C b p C b
1 p d t b p b C
1 p 1 p d t b C
C .
    
     
    

+ +
+ +
+ +
−   −  − − +  −  +
= −   −  − +  −  − 
 = −  − −  −  − − 
 
 − 
 
Inequality (39) uses loss aversion, λ ≥ 1, and subcertainty. Thus, the value of placing 
another bid is strictly greater than the value of not bidding if at least one of these inequalities 
(loss aversion and subcertainty) is strict. 
Part 2 
( )f x is concave: A bidder who has not yet placed a bid in the auction is indifferent between 
bidding at time t or not if 
(40) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t 1 t 11 p f d t b p f b 0.   + +−  −  − +  −  =  
If a bidder has already accumulated bidding fees of tC , with td t b C 0 −  − −  , her valuation 
of another bid is 
(41) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t
t
1 p f d t C b p f C b
1 p f d t b 1 p f C p f b p f C
1 p f C p f C
1 p p f C
f C .
   
      
  
  

+ +
+ + + +
+ +
+ +
−  −  − − +  −  +
 −  −  − − −  +  −  +  − 
= − −  +  − 
  − +  −  
 − 
  
The first inequality uses the concavity of f ; inserting Equation (40) yields the equality, and 
the last two inequalities use loss aversion, λ ≥ 1, and subcertainty, respectively. Thus, the 
value of placing another bid is strictly greater than the value of not bidding if at least one of 
these inequalities is strict. 
If the accumulated bidding fees of tC  exceed d t b −  − , then the valuation of another bid is 
(42) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t
1 p f C d t b p f C b
1 p f C d t b p f b p f C
1 p f C d t b 1 p f d t b p f C .
    
      
      
+ +
+ + +
+ + +
−  −  − −  − +  −  +
 −  −  − −  − +  −  +  − 
= −  −  − −  − − −  −  − +  − 
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The inequality uses the concavity of f ; inserting Equation (40) yields the equality. This 
expression is greater than or equal to ( ) ( )tf C−  , if 
(43) 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
t 1
1
t 1 t t
1 p f d t b
.
1 p f C f C d t b
 
 
 
+
+
− −  −
  
− − − −  −
 
Part 3 
( )f x is convex: If a bidder has already accumulated bidding fees of tC  and 
td t b C 0 −  − −  , her valuation of another bid is 
(44) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t
1 p f d t C b p f C b
1 p f d t b C f d t b p f b C f d t b
1 p C f d t b p C f d t b .
   
     
    
+ +
+ +
+ +
−  −  − − +  −  +
     −  −  − −  −  − +  −  +  −  −   
 = − −   −  − +  −   −  −
 
The inequality sign follows from the convexity of f ; inserting Equation (40) yields the 
equality. This expression is greater than or equal to ( ) ( )tf C−  , if 
(45) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
t 1 t 1
a
tt 1
t 1
t
1 p 1 p
.
f C1 p
f d t b p
C
 
 

 
+ +
+
+
− −
  
−
 −  − −
 
If the accumulated bidding fees of tC  exceed d t b −  − , her valuation of another bid is 
(46) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t 1 t t 1 t
t 1 t t 1 t
2 t 1
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t
t 1
1 p f C d t b p f C b
1 p f C f d t b p f C b
p
1 p f C 1 p f b p f C b .
1 p
    
    

     

+ +
+ +
+
+ + +
+
−  −  − −  − +  −  +
  −  −  − −  − +  −  + 
= −  −  + −  −   +  −  +
−
The inequality sign follows from the convexity of f ; inserting Equation (40) yields the 
equality. This expression is greater than or equal to ( ) ( )tf C−  , if 
(47) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
t 1 t t
b
t 1
1 p f C b f C
.
1 p f b

 

+
+
− + −
  
−
 
Thus, the value of placing another bid is strictly greater than the value of not bidding if 
( )
( )
 t 1 a b 2
t 1
1 p
max ,
1 p

   

+
+
−
  
−
.   
